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21 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
of a would-be suitor to the lady of his choice and who is as yet
unpledged, but such a relationship is not inchoate for not only may
the lady decline his advances but any other person may enter into
the competition. It is not the relationship of the dog to a flea which
is ferae naturae and is wandering upon the sands and which any
other dog may first devour. It is in a measure similar to the rela-
tionship of a dog to a flea on his own back, which, no matter how
elusive, is within his own peculiar sphere of influence and which
no other dog may destroy without committing trespass. Yet unlike
the right to court a lady and the right to destroy the industrious
flea, which no doubt are natural and inalienable rights, it is a right
which the legislature may take away.
To the man in the street then an inchoate right is a mesonomic
relationship based upon a special privilege but whose consumma-
tion is dependent either upon the will of another or the happening
of a certain event and which before consummation, by legislative
action, may be taken away. ANDREW A. BRUcE.
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN COMPANIES OPERATING MOTOR Bus
LINE .- [Federal] A bus corporation operated bus lines between
points in Illinois and points in Indiana. An Indiana city arrested
the drivers of the buses for violation of an brdinance which made
it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle engaged in transporting
passengers for hire over portions of the streets within the city
limits and prohibiting such vehicles from stopping for the purpose
of receiving and discharging passengers upon certain designated
streets and providing that nothing in the ordinance should be
construed to impair the obligation of any contract to which the city
was a party under which motor vehicles were then operated for
hire within said city. The bus corporation brought a suit to enjoin
the enforcement of the ordinance. It was conceded that a local
bus company came within the exception and was operating in the
city under a contract with the city, and that it was not required to
observe the ordinance. Held: that the ordinance was invalid as a
police regulation for the reason that it discriminated against the
company which had no contract.'
The court does not concede the right of the city to control
the operation of motor buses, but assumes for the purpose of the
case that the power existed, and says: "We are of the opinion
that the ordinance cannot be sustained as a police regulation and it
is not claimed that it can be sustained upon any other theory. Even
police regulations must be fair and reasonable for all citizens alike,
so far as may be, and without discrimination. The ordinance in
question does not respond to these requirements. By its terms, it
permits some concerns to do the identical things from the doing
of which appellee claims it has the right, under the ordinance, to
exclude appellant."
1. Schappi Bus Line, Inc., v. City of Hammond 11 Fed. (2nd) 940. The
Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari in this case.
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
The substance of the court's decision is that the ordinance
in question was void for the reason that it was discriminatory.
If it be admitted that the ordinance was within the general
powers of the city council and was upon a subject upon which
the council was empowered to act, then if there is anything which
imposes a duty upon the city to enact an ordinance which does not
discriminate, it can only be either the constitution of Indiana or the
Constitution of the United States.2
The only clause in the constitution of the state of Indiana
which could possibly be applicable is section 23 of Article 1,3 which
provides: "The general assembly shall not grant to any citizen
or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which upon the same
terms shall not equally belong to all citizens." But this section of
the constitution does not apply to citizens of other states doing
business in the state of Indiana,4 and a corporation is not a citizen
within the meaning of this section and the similar section of the
Constitution of the United States.5
The due process clause, and the equal protection clause of the
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution do not protect
the bus company for the reason that the privilege of doing business
for profit in the streets of a municipality is strictly a privilege and
not a right; it may be withheld for no reason at all, and may con-
sequently be regulated.8
When the court in the instant case says: "Even the police
regulations must be fair and reasonable for all citizens alike, so
far as may be, and without discrimination," it is submitted that
the language of the case is incorrect and the result erroneous. The
rule, of course, is that there can be no discrimination as between
persons in the same situation, but one who holds a franchise as a
public utility is not in the same situation as one who has no franchise,
and consequently no right. The decision in the instant case is in
direct conflict with the case of Packard v. Banton.7
BERNARD C. GAVIT.
REsTRICTIvE COVENANTS-RESIDENCE PURPOSES ONLY.-[Flor-
ida] In the case of Moore v. Stevens' the covenant in question was:
"that the property hereby conveyed is to be used for residence pur-
poses only; that only one residence shall be erected on each lot, and
2. Harper v. Galloway 58 Fla. 255, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 794; Central
Lumber Company v. South Dakota 226 U. S. 157, 57 U. S. L. ed. 164.
3. (1926) Bums' Ann. Ind. Stat. sec. 75. There is no due process
clause in the Indiana Constitution.
4. Sears v. Board 36 Ind. 267.
5. Inland Steel Company v. Yedinak 172 Ind. 423, 87 N. E. 229; West-
ern Turf Assn. v. Greenberg 204 U. S. 359, 51 L. ed. 520.
6. Packard v. Banton 264 U. S. 140, 68 L. ed. 596; Buck v. Kuyken-
dall 267 U. S. 307, 69 1. ed. 623; Frick v. City of Gary 192 Ind. 76, 135 N. E.
346; Denny v. City of Muncie (Ind.) 149 N. E. 649; Partners Telephone
Company v. Boswell 187 Ind. 371, 119 N. E. 513.
7. 264 U. S. 140, 68, L. ed. 596.
1. (1926) 106 So. 901.
